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Medical Malpractice Arbitration
in the New Millennium:
Much Ado About Nothing?
SUMMARY
Ann H. Nevers
Arbitration of medical malpractice cases has been used as a method to
control the risk and cost of litigation for a number of years. However, the
number of medical malpractice claims has remained low even though legisla-
tures and the courts have upheld arbitration. The question is whether we have
made "much ado about nothing" by creating an environment conducive to
medical malpractice arbitration even though it is so rarely used. This paper
reviews the constitutional issues surrounding medical malpractice arbitration
clauses and the implementation of arbitration contracts, and the existing medi-
cal malpractice process. Federal preemption issues under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, enterprise liability and ERISA preemption, and cybermalpractice
will be discussed. Finally, dispute resolution industry standards implemented
by the American Arbitration Association and American Health Lawyers Asso-
ciation will be reviewed as well as current medical malpractice mediation
practices in industry. While the past has shown that arbitration has not been
used a great deal future trends may increase use. Emerging medical malprac-
tice arbitration issues arising in the new millennium include (1) the use of
medical malpractice awards in credentialing and provider selection (2) the use
of arbitration in collective bargaining agreements between physicians and hos-
pitals or managed care organizations (3) the finding of enterprise liability for
hospitals, health plans, and managed care organizations and the extent of ER-
ISA preemption of such liability and (4) cybermalpractice issues that arise
from negligent provision of health care through telemedicine or on the
Interet.
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Medical Malpractice Arbitration
in the New Millennium:
Much Ado about Nothing?
Ann H. Nevers, J.D., L.L.M. (Health Law)
Medical malpractice litigation and arbitration have been part of the
human experience for millennia. One of the earliest reported malpractice
cases was in 1374 involving a surgeon who was sued for negligent treat-
ment of a wound.'
Historically, medical malpractice claims have been resolved through
tort-based litigation.2 Some of the problems associated with the tort sys-
tem include "the high emotional and financial costs to the litigants, the
detrimental effect on the doctor-patient relationship, and the inability of
tort litigation to deter physician negligence." 3 There have also been con-
cerns about the quality of medical expert witnesses, the high number of
non-meritorious cases, and the high visibility of such litigation.4 Medical
practitioners facing lawsuits strongly defend themselves from lawsuits be-
cause of concerns about the loss of reputation and future discipline or
credentialing departicipation,5 while the emotionally charged issues of ill-
ness, death, and dying may create compelling reasons for the plaintiff to
litigate to the full extent possible.6
1. See Tom J. Manos, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the Morning - Medical
Malpractice in Managed Care: Are HAOs Practicing Medicine Isithout a License?. 53 U. M lmu
L. REv. 195, 199 (1998).
2. See Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can
Alleviate the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation. 17 Outo ST J, o. Dsp. RESOL. 907
(1999).
3. Id.
4. See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Afalpractice Arbitration. 31 WAE
FoaRnsr L R1Ev. 203 (1996).
5. See David Zukher, The Role of Arbitration in Resoh'ing Medical Malpractice Disputes:
Will A Well-Drafted Arbitration Agreement Help the Medicine Go Down? 49 SYRACUSE L REv
135, 145 (1998).
6. See Bryan A. Liang, Understanding and Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution Meth.
ods in Modem Medical Conflict, 19 J. Legal Med. 397 (1998).
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These concerns only arise after the patient has entered the system by
filing a lawsuit. A Harvard study of the relationship between malpractice
claims and adverse events from negligence found that only about one in
eight patients who had experienced negligent care filed a lawsuit.7 Simi-
larly a 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO) Study of the Michigan ar-
bitration system found that between 1975 and 1991 (sixteen years) there
were only 882 arbitration proceedings that emerged from an estimated
20,000 malpractice claims. The GAO study recommended mandatory arbi-
tration or the creation of economic incentives such as the reduction of
health care insurance premiums to encourage potential plaintiffs to arbi-
trate rather than litigate their claims.8 Because relatively few patients who
have experienced negligent care file a malpractice lawsuit, few patients
are properly compensated for the injuries sustained.9 Because of this lack
of access to the judicial system for medical negligence claims, the ability
of any system to provide redress for the patient and thus impact the future
behavior of negligent practitioners is severely limited. A study of 1,000
anesthesiology claims found that 54% of the medical malpractice claims
involved inappropriate care. Of these cases, 80% of the plaintiffs received
a recovery. Most cases of inappropriate care did not receive compensa-
tion. In addition, there were a number of malpractice lawsuits filed where
the care had been appropriate."' Even though two-thirds of malpractice
claims filed turn out to be without merit, malpractice claims are still twice
as likely to go to trial as other types of personal injury lawsuits.'
Other systems for recovery have been proposed including a no-fault
liability system that would compensate injuries from a pool of money
without determining negligence. Under this system, compensation would
be more accessible to more people. On the other hand, the cost of com-
pensating more people while providing no deterrence for negligence con-
duct is a significant disadvantage to this approach.' 2 Furthermore, a total
7. The study also found that the risk of sustaining an adverse event increased with age.
Those over sixty-five had more than twice the chance of an adverse event as those between six-
teen and forty-four. See Russel A. Localio, Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 111, 325 NEw E O. J.
MED. 245, 248 (1991).
8. See Medical Malpractice: Few Claims Resolved Through Michigan's Voluntary Arbitra-
tion Program, GAOIHRDD 91-38 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter Michigan GAO Report].
9. See Forehand, supra note 2, at 907.
10. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Book Review: Understanding the Malpractice Wars Medical
Malpractice on Trial, (Paul C. Weiler), 106 HA. L. REv. 1157, 1162 (1993).
11. Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47
RuTGERS L. Rev. 1157, 1162 (1995).
12. See id. at 915.
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system transformation would make the impact and costs of a new system
hard to predict. Arbitration is a solution based on contract law.' 3 In 1991,
the Utah Medical Association conducted a study of 500 closed malprac-
tice claims and 500 potential claims and concluded that a no-fault plan
would reduce the severity of the claims, but the increased frequency of
claims would increase the total costs by one-third. Insurance consumers
would face premium increases of 50%.4
In the 1970's the focus turned to cost. Large jury awards led to
higher malpractice insurance costs and created a malpractice crisis that
legislatures responded to with a volley of tort reform legislation.' 5
Processes implemented to control the risk and costs of large verdicts in-
cluded shortened statutes of limitations, limitation of non-economic dam-
age awards through "damage caps", structuring of malpractice payments
through periodic payments, implementation of "collateral source" rules
requiring the courts to look at other sources through which compensation
may be available to avoid "double compensation" for one event, develop-
ment of state and medical association sponsored liability insurance, statu-
tory immunity provisions for state entities including state hospitals and
employees, and the advent of arbitration as the preferred means of resolv-
ing the dispute. 16 Through the 1980's these systems were implemented
through a variety of methods in many states and tested by the courts.
The reasons to resolve medical malpractice disputes through arbitra-
tion include the parties ability to control the procedure, the ability to se-
lect the arbitrator or expert, reduced cost, shortened time to resolve the
dispute, finality of the decision, privacy, reduced emotional trauma of liti-
gation, and self autonomy through the ability to contract and resolve dis-
putes outside of the courts.17 Arbitration makes it easier for the parties in-
13. See idL
14. See Neville M. Bilimoria, New Medicine for Medical Malpractice: 7he Empirical Tnith
About Legislative Initiatives for Medical Malpractice Reform - Part !, 27 HasP. L 10. 306. 312
(1994).
15. Malpractice concerns also lead to increased practice of "defensive medicine" in which
multiple tests and procedures were performed to satisfy patient expectations or to defend against
malpractice. See Rebecca A. Cemy, Arbitration or Litigation: Efficacy and Fairness in Resolving
Medical Malpractice Disputes Through Arbitration Proceedings, 27 J. HEmI L 7, 193, 194
(1994).
16. See Forehand, supra note 2, at 912. See also Zukher, supra note 5, at 148.
17. See Metzloff supra note 4, at 210. See also Zukher. supra note 5. at 152.
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volved to maintain their relationships while increasing the opportunity for
the claimant to be satisfied.t 8 A 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO)
study of medical malpractice litigation found that arbitration took less
time than litigation, 9 was effective in compensating more plaintiff's for
their injuries, 20 and yielded lower and more consistent awards. 2' In arbitra-
tion, every dollar of the arbitration award goes to the plaintiff whereas in
traditional litigation, a large amount of the award lands in the pockets of
the plaintiff's attorney. Arbitration is also seen as a tool to limit the risk
of conflict.2
In spite of the reasons given for use of arbitration, arbitration has not
been widely used. Reasons for this include judicial hostility that questions
the use of arbitration in the malpractice context.23 State statutes intended
to facilitate arbitration created detailed requirements that may have be-
come a barrier to arbitration, 24 and empirical research has shown that mal-
practice arbitration statutes have not increased the incidence of medical
malpractice arbitration.25 There is also a bias against arbitration among the
parties. "Repeat Players" in the litigation context such as malpractice in-
surers and defense attorneys have a certain comfort level with the protec-
tions afforded by the litigation process including judicial encouragement
of settlement, availability of summary judgment, and other motion activi-
ties while the plaintiffs' bar perceives arbitration as being biased towards
the defendant.26 Arbitration does not alleviate the concerns inherent in the
litigation system, but simply replaces a judge with an arbitrator.27 Even
within the alternative dispute resolution arena, there is no consensus that
arbitration is the best form of ADR for medical malpractice since there
may be a predisposition toward making compromise decisions that may
18. See Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moiler and John E. Rolph, Medical Malpractice: External
Influences and Controls: Article: Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60
L. & CoNTrEP PROB. 155 (1997).
19. Medical malpractice litigation took thirty-three months to resolve the claim through the
court, while arbitration took nineteen months. See Medical Malpractice: Alternatives to Litiga-
tion, United States General Accounting Office Report to Congress, 9 (January, 1992).
20. Plaintiffs in litigation won about one-third (33%) of their cases, while plaintiffs in arbi-
tration won 52% of their cases. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Metzloff, supra note 4, at 211.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id at 213.
26. See id. at 212, 220.
27. See id at 215.
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not fully compensate harm.2 Some also feel that the arbitrator as a "re-
peat player" in arbitration proceedings may have a bias towards the party
that would be in a position to reselect the arbitrator. If a truly simple ap-
proach to administrating these cases were found, then there is a concern
that the number of malpractice claims would increase.?
A malpractice project at Duke Law School's Private Adjudication
Center used a case-by case-approach to inform parties of the opportunity
to use binding arbitration. Nineteen cases went to arbitration with seven
focusing on liability and twelve focusing on damages.3 The arbitrations
were shown to be efficient with the average proceeding lasting six
hours.31 Other economic analysis have also indicated that ADR is more
efficient than traditional approaches 2 However, in the Duke study, there
were a number of times when the parties, attorneys, and malpractice in-
surer did not all agree to arbitration. This lack of agreement lessened the
total number of lawsuits that used arbitration as a tool to resolve the
dispute.33
A Rand survey that asked California physicians, hospitals and liMOs
about the prevalence of arbitration agreements found that "only nine per-
cent of the.hospitals and nine percent of the physicians" routinely used
arbitration agreements.M However, "twenty percent of patients admitted to
hospitals signed arbitration agreements." 35 Even though the percentage of
physicians using agreements was small, it was increasing. Of those physi-
cians currently using arbitration agreements, over sixty percent had
adopted them since 1990. 6 Two factors were found to relate to the inci-
dence of arbitration agreements: insurer support for the agreements and
physician practice within HMOs.37 Fifty-seven percent of physicians who
were members of CAP/MPT, a professional liability coverage provider
that strongly encouraged arbitration agreements, used arbitration agree-
28. See i. at 217, 219.
29. See i. at 218.
30. See Uo. at 223.
31. See id. at 224.
32. See Liang, supra note 6, at 414-26.
33. See Metzloff, supra note 4, at 222.
34. See Rolph, et aL, supra note 18, at 171.
35. 1&
36. See id. at 178.
37. See id.
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ments in their practice compared with six percent of physicians insured by
other providers. 38 Thirty-one percent of the physicians use arbitration
agreements because it is the policy of their practice group, while thirty-
four percent use them because they believe arbitration is a more cost ef-
fective way to resolve disputes.39 Of those with arbitration agreements in
place, ninety-six percent of physicians were satisfied with them. 40
In contrast, the California Association of Health Maintenance Organi-
zations (CAHMO) reported that while seventy-one percent of the HMOs
used arbitration agreements with their members, none of the PPOs used
arbitration agreements. 4' While HMO arbitration clauses could be used for
coverage disputes or medical malpractice issues, the survey found that the
arbitration agreements were used in coverage disputes and the total num-
ber of arbitrations actually held were less than four per million. 42 The
study concluded that few disputes take place through private binding arbi-
tration, yet arbitration agreements are becoming more common in the
marketplace as a result of pro-arbitration organizational policies.43
So what is the future of medical malpractice arbitration in the new
millennium? Have we made "much ado about nothing" with statutes, re-
search, and pilot programs demonstrating that extremely low numbers of
cases actually use arbitration in medical malpractice? This article will ex-
amine the current status of medical malpractice arbitration, the constitu-
tionality of arbitration clauses, use and enforceability of arbitration con-
tracts, the arbitration process itself including prelitigation panels,
arbitration statutes and practices, damage limits, and reportability of
awards. Federal preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the-
ories of enterprise liability, the Employee Retirement Income and Security
Act (ERISA), and current telemedicine, cybermedicine, and cybermalprac-
tice issues will be discussed. Finally, dispute resolution industry standards
that apply in medical malpractice arbitration will be reviewed along with
the use of mediation in medical malpractice.
38. See id. at 175.
39. See id, at 174.
40. See Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller, and John E. Rolph, Medical Malpractice: External
Influences and Controls: Article: Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality,60 L.
& CoNrrEP PROB. 155 (1997).
41. See id. at 173.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 177.
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I CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
The constitutionality of medical malpractice arbitration has been chal-
lenged on a number of grounds. Some have argued that arbitration violates
due process either on grounds of substantive due process, when medical mal-
practice litigants are treated differently than other litigants because of the ar-
bitration agreement, or on grounds of procedural due process when parties are
required to proceed in the arbitration forum without the same procedural pro-
tections available through judicial proceedings.-" The use of a medical review
panel composed of practitioners has also been challenged as a violation of
substantive due process because the panel assumes the role of the jury as the
primary factfinder.4 An early Alaska Supreme Court decision dismissed this
argument holding that decision making regarding the complex medical issues
involved in malpractice cases is facilitated by expert panel members and there
is no inherent bias based on being a medical provider. 46 This is similar to the
equal protection challenges that focus on different treatment of medical mal-
practice litigants from others litigants.
Others have argued that an agreement to arbitrate violates the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury and is therefore unconstitutional. To address this
issue, some arbitration statutes provide procedural protections that require that
arbitration agreements "cannot be a condition for providing health care, must
be in a separate instrument, may not limit substantive rights, and must be
given to a patient for reaffirmation upon discharge from the hospital." 4'
In 1980, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional-
ity of the state medical malpractice statute and found the statute to be uncon-
stitutional on a several grounds. The court found that the expert witness re-
quirements were too burdensome for plaintiffs to prove their case.s The court
further found that the restriction barring minors from bringing a cause of ac-
44. See Keys v. Humana Hospital, Inc., 750 P.2d 343 (Alas. 1988) (holding that a statute
mandating pretrial review of medical malpractice claims by expert advisory panel does not vio-
late substantive due process).
45. See id. at 351.
46. In making the decision, the court distinguished an Illinois court decision to not uphold
a prelifigation panel in that the Illinois panel was the sole basis for making a malpractice deci-
sion, while the Alaska panel merely served as an expert opinion at trial. See Id. at 356.
47. Norman P. Jeddeloh, Use of Arbitration in Health Care Industry. Non-Labor Matters,
22 J. oF HEALTH L 11, 354 (1989).
48. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (N.H. 1980).
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tion was unreasonable in light of the small numbers of plaintiffs in this cate-
gory.49 Elimination of the collateral source rule in malpractice actions raised
the cost on the general public.50 Damage caps for pain and suffering pre-
vented victims from receiving full compensation for their injuries and limiting
attorney fees had a questionable relationship to containing jury awards. 51 Fi-
nally, the two year statute of limitation based on occurrence precluded a law-
suit before the plaintiff had the opportunity to discover the cause of action. 52
The Ohio legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court have disagreed about
malpractice legislative provisions. In August 1999, the court struck down the
Ohio Comprehensive Tort Reform Act as unconstitutional for the following
reasons. 53 The court held that the Act violated the state constitutional one-
subject provision that requires legislation to focus on one subject. Further, it
held that punitive damage caps of $100,000 or three times compensatory
damages for small corporations and $250,000 for large corporations were an
unconstitutional violation of the right to a jury trial. The jury should be al-
lowed to decide the amount of damages. Non-economic damage caps in the
Act had expanded the scope of a statute previously declared unconstitutional.
The damage cap was held unconstitutional because there was no rational con-
nection between non-economic damages and malpractice insurance. -14 The stat-
ute of limitations within the statute was six years. Another similar statute that
deprived a claimant of the right to a remedy before he or she knows of the
lawsuit had previously been declared unconstitutional, so when the Ohio leg-
islature enacted the statute of limitations for the tort reform act it indicated
that it "respectfully disagreed" with the Ohio Supreme Court.55 The Ohio Su-
preme Court struck down the new provision as unconstitutional. The collat-
eral benefit provision provided for the jury to be instructed about collateral
benefits. The court held that it was unconstitutional to permit a setoff without
showing what payments would be set off from. 56 Finally, the legislature set a
standard of review for toxic tort cases. The court held that it was an unconsti-
tutional separation of legal power for the legislature to establish the standard
of review, the standard of review was something that the court should
49. See id. at 833-34.
50. See id at 835-36.
51. See id at 835-40.
52. See id
53. State Supreme Court Strikes Down Tort Reform Statute in Entirety, 7 HEALTHi CARE3
POL'Y REP'. 35 (BNA) 1409 (August 30, 1999).
54. See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d 1062
(1999).
55. See supra note 49.
56. See Sheward, supra note 50, at 1095.
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decide.s7
IL MEDICAL MALPRACrICE ARBITRATION CONTRACrS
1. Adhesion Contracts
Medical malpractice arbitration contracts have been attacked on the
grounds that they are unconscionable adhesion contracts.- An adhesion con-
tract is defined as a standardized contract form offered to a consumer on a
take it or leave it basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity
to bargain so that the consumer does not have a choice to accept or refuse
it 59 For example, the Nevada Supreme Court held a medical malpractice arbi-
tration agreement to be an unenforceable adhesion contract because the
weaker party was not alerted to the agreement or its consequences.w In Ari-
zona, the Broemmer case involved a 21-year-old who sought an abortion.
Prior to the abortion, she was given three things to sign including the arbitra-
tion agreement. The caregivers did not discuss the arbitration agreement with
her. During the abortion, her uterus ruptured.6' The court found that knowing
consent and reasonable expectation are fundamental to valid contracts. The
court found that the arbitration agreement went beyond plaintiff's reasonable
expectation since there was no evidence that she knowingly waived her right
to a jury trial. 62 In looking at the facts that the party had no real choice of
terms and could not obtain the desired services elsewhere, the court decided
that the agreement to arbitrate was not enforceable.6
On the other hand, in Buraczynski v. Eyring, the Tennessee Supreme
Court reviewed two medical malpractice arbitration agreements.64 The appel-
lants argued that the agreements were too broad to be enforceable and that
the statute did not apply to retroactive agreements. Respondents claimed that
specificity was not required in arbitration agreements and that these agree-
57. See id.
58. See Zukher, supra note 5, at 142.
59. See id.
60. See Obstetrics and Gynecologists William G. Wixted, M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan.
M.D., William F Robinson, M.D. Ltd. V. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
61. See Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Pheonix Ltd., 840 P.2d 1014-15 (Ariz. 1992).
62. See i&
63. See id. at 1015.
64. See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996).
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ments have been uniformly upheld. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
arbitration agreement and found that the agreements were enforceable because
they were supported by consideration and not oppressive or unconscionable. 65
The Tennessee court reviewed the facts to find that there was no indication
that the patient could not question the agreement, nor did the patient have to
choose between a jury trial right and necessary medical treatment, nor that
there was an unequal advantage in the arbitration process itself.66 Because of
procedural safeguards that make arbitration feasible, the Tennessee Uniform
Arbitration Act was passed to established the desirability of upholding arbitra-
tion agreements. Such procedural protections include having the agreement on
a separate document that does not provide an unfair advantage to the doctor
or limit his liability, contract provisions that draw attention to the fact that
the right to a jury trial is being waived, and provision of a revocation period
are all elements that allow the member to make an informed choice.67
When state statutes create a framework for guidelines to regulate arbitra-
tion agreements with safeguards against overreaching by the health care pro-
vider, the courts will uphold the agreements in an attempt to maintain public
policy that encourages arbitration. 6 Arbitration agreements that comply with
statutory law and protect against overreaching are likely to survive judicial
determination of unconscionability.69 Unconscionability can be in the form of
substantive unconscionability that "deals with contract terms that are unrea-
sonably favorable to one side"70 or procedural unconscionability that "deals
with the process of contract formation, encompassing the employment of
sharp practices, the use of fine print and convoluted language, lack of under-
standing, and inequality of bargaining power."' 7' Questions of unconscionab-
lity often are decided based on the facts.
A well-drafted arbitration clause can be "self-executing." This means
that it will allow the party to go forward with the arbitration including the ap-
pointment of the arbitrator and the arbitration hearing whether the other party
agrees to arbitrate or not.72 A self-executing clause "shifts the burden to the
party resisting arbitration to obtain an order from the court staying the arbi-
65. See id. at 321.
66. Id.
67. Jennifer Gillespie, Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreements: Procedural Safeguards
May Not be Enough, 1997 J. Disp. RESOL. 119, 130.
68. Zukher, supra note 5, at 143.
69. Id. at 144. See also Flora v. Moses, 727 A.2d 596 (PA. 1999) which upheld a state ar-
bitration statute.
70. See Zukher, supra note 5, at 163.
71. Id.
72. IM at 166.
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tration by making a showing that the dispute is beyond the scope of the arbi-
tration agreement, or contains an illegal aspect precluding the resolution of
the dispute by arbitration."' 3 Anything that would require the party seeking to
arbitrate to go to court to compel arbitration would not be considered when a
"self-executing" arbitration clause is in place.74 Therefore language that indi-
cates that the party seeking arbitration has the right to proceed despite the re-
fusal of the opposing party and that "arbitration may only be avoided by a
valid court order" would create a self-executing arbitration agreement."
It has also been proposed that notice of the agreement to arbitrate be in-
cluded in a document that should be provided so that the patient is aware that
he or she waived the right to have a judge or jury decide the claim76Some
have proposed that a separate consent form and patient booklet describing ar-
bitration be provided to the patient.n The arbitration clause provision itself
should contain information regarding any standards that limit the arbitrator's
decision, designate how the parties will submit their dispute to arbitration,
and indicate choice of law provisions.78 The arbitration agreement can also re-
quire the arbitrator to prepare a written opinion explaining the basis and rea-
sons for the arbitrator decision.79
2. Timaing of the Agreement
Some state statutes provide for a period of time to revoke an arbitration
clause. For example, a California statute provides for a thirty day revoca-
tion.80 This has been upheld by the California Court of Appeals and arbitra-
tion agreements have been applied to subsequent treatment when there was no
written revocation within the thirty days.8' Colorado gives ninety days to re-
voke an agreement.8 Louisiana and New York limit revocation to a specific
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See David Zukher, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes:
Will a Well-Drafted Arbitration Agreement Help the Medicine Go Down?, 49 SyRACUSE L REV,
135, 168 (1998).
77. See id. at 170.
78. See id. at 169-72.
79. See i& at 173.
80. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1295 (West 1999).
81. See Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. CL App. 1988).
82. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (Supp. 1994).
13
Nevers: Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado A
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2000
period of time as long as treatment has not been rendered.8 1
Medical malpractice arbitration agreements are typically signed when
services are rendered. However, a case in Utah where the arbitration agree-
ment was signed minutes or hours before surgery was held invalid.M The ar-
bitration included a provision requiring the patient to pay the physician's arbi-
tration fees if the arbitration award was less than half of the amount claimed.
This was found to be substantially unconscionable and to violate public pol-
icy. 85 In Michigan, a 60-day period of revocation was tolled until the per-
sonal representative of the decedent had an opportunity to discover the arbi-
tration provision.8 6 In California, an arbitration clause signed after non-
emergency treatment, where there were other available physicians, that in-
cluded a 30-day revocation clause was upheld. 87 The Alabama Medical Liabil-
ity Act requires that an agreement to arbitrate a medical liability dispute be
agreed to after the medical services were rendered and the claim has arisen.88
3. Collective Bargaining
Managed care has changed the practice of medicine for physicians as
"the managed care model inserts insurers as an intermediary into medical de-
cision making and the practice of medicine." 89 This has resulted in legal chal-
lenges to hospitals, managed care organizations, and other entities for medical
malpractice under various th8ories of enterprise liability as discussed later.90 It
has also impacted the bargaining power of physicians leading to increased in-
terest in physician unionization.91 It has been estimated that about 14,000 to
20,000 of the nation's 700,000 physicians belong to unions.92 Of these, about
half are residents or interns. 93 The two largest unions are the Union of Ameri-
can Physicians and Dentists (UAPD) which has about 5,000 members most of
whom reside in California, and the Federation of Physicians and Dentists
83. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4235 (West 1997); see also N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. §
7550 (McKinney 1998).
84. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
85. See id.
86. See Appeals Court Overturns Arbitration Agreement Between Patient, Hospital, 7
HEALTH L. REP. 20 (BNA), 776, May 14, 1998.
87. See CAL. Civ. PRoc CODE § 1295.
88. Alabama Medical Liability Act § 6-5-485 (1975).
89. Ellen L. Luepke, White Collar, Blue Collar: Physician Unionization and Managed
Care, 8 ANN. HEALTH L. 275 (1999).
90. Zukher, supra note 5, at 161.
91. Luepke, supra note 88, at 275.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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(FPD) which represents physicians and dentists in Florida and other states. "'
Further, the American Medical Association (AMA) has formally announced
support for physician unionization and has formed an independent organiza-
tion called Physicians for Responsible Negotiation (PRN). 95 PRN has since
been asked to represent Detroit HMO doctors who have voted for union rep-
resentation. The HMO had questioned the right of physicians to unionize
claiming that they were supervisory employees and that other caregivers
should be included in the union. However, the NLRB rejected the HMO
claims clearing the way for the physicians to vote on unionization. PRN who
represents the physicians has indicated that the physicians do not plan to
strike or with hold essential services if a dispute arises."
The Clayton Act enables labor organizations to represent their members
in collective bargaining.97 The Clayton Act specifically exempts human labor
from antitrust laws by indicating that human labor is not an item or commod-
ity in commerce subject to antitrust regulation.98 Thus, physicians who are
employees can join unions that will collectively negotiate for them as long as
they are true employees as defined under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).99 However, independent contractors and supervisory employees are
excluded from the definition of "employee" and many physicians have con-
tractual relationships as staff members affiliated with a hospital or preferred
providers in a managed care network.100
In determining whether the physician is an employee qualified for collec-
tive bargaining, the courts will look at a number of factors to determine
whether the physician still retains a large amount of autonomy and control or
whether the employer directs the place, type and other activities of work.
94. Other physicians unions include the Doctors Council, a New York based union for
physicians employed in New York, the Physicians Professional Networks Group based in Florida.
and the Office of Professional Employer International Union. See id. at 281. 282.
95. Press Release: AMA Announces Next Steps in Creating A National Negotiating Organi-
zation for Employed Physicians, (visited Sept. 9. 1999), <http:wwv.ara-assn.orgad-comfrelease/
19991pmnextstep.htn>.
96. See Physicians at Detroit HAO rote for Union after NLRB rejects health plans ap-
peaL 8 H a 'm CAmE POL'Y REP. (BNA) 12, 453 (March 20. 2000). See also AMA.Created Unit
Files NLRB petition seeking representation of HAlO doctors. 9 HEnLuh LAw REP. (BNA) 5. 171
(Feb. 3, 2000)
97. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914).
98. See iL
99. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947).
100. See id.
15
Nevers: Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado A
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2000
Specific factors that will be reviewed include the amount of control the indi-
vidual has over the work, whether the occupation is separate and distinct, the
type of occupation, whether the employer directs the work, whether the em-
ployer provides the workplace and equipment to complete the work, the de-
gree of skill required to complete the task, the length of time the agreement
between the parties is in place, the method of payment, and the parties belief
concerning the work. 10'
Questions that remain unanswered in the malpractice context of physi-
cian collective bargaining are whether use of arbitration clauses will become
a routine part of bargaining as they are in the labor setting and whether arbi-
tration would be perceived as favoring one party over the other. Further, will
such agreements include provisions determining who bears the responsibility
for negligence? Will arbitration clauses formed in collective bargaining con-
text with physicians be used to resolve negligence cases?
4. Contract Enforceability
Arbitration agreements are generally considered enforceable against the
party who signed the valid arbitration agreement. However, a Court of Ap-
peals in Washington D.C. found that the presumption of arbitrability attaches
after the court has determined that a valid arbitration agreement does in fact
exist. Because their were questions of fact about an insurance contract that in-
cluded an agreement to arbitrate, the trial court denied summary judgment in
order to determine the validity of the arbitration contract. The court then went
on to find that the claims for health care coverage did not arise under the
agreement with the arbitration clause, therefore the arbitration clause did not
apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 1 2
California arbitration cases have found that medical malpractice arbitra-
tion agreements can be enforced against a number of non-signatory parties. In
California, a contract against a pregnant minor is enforceable as a matter of
public policy. There was a concern that medical providers would refuse to
treat minors if the provisions were not upheld. 03 Further a minor child can be
bound by the mother in an agreement to arbitrate made during the prenatal
period. The court has interpreted the arbitration clause to apply to any claim
arising from the services under the agreement, even though the plaintiff had
not been born at the time the arbitration agreement was signed. 04 A key to
101. Luepke, supra note 88, at 290.
102. George Washington University v. Scott, 711 A.2d 1257 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998).
103. See Weeks v. Crow, 169 Cal. Rptr 830, 832 (1980).
104. See Wilson v. Kaiser Found Hosp., 190 Cal Rptr. 649, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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enforceability of arbitration in the future is the general policy of upholding
arbitration agreements.1°5 In 1987, the California Court of Appeals established
that an arbitration agreement between a physician and patient covered the
continuing professional relationship, not just the initial treatment.106 The court
found that compliance with the arbitration act was sufficient to uphold the ar-
bitration agreement. ° In Gross v. Recabaren, a noncontractual spouse filed a
lawsuit for loss of consortium because of the malpractice negligence in the
doctor's failure to diagnose the patient. The court found that when a patient
contracts to submit any dispute regarding medical malpractice to arbitration,
that all claims arising from the alleged malpractice must be arbitrated.'t In
1993, the California Court of Appeals also upheld an arbitration agreement
that was made retroactively. °9 Similarly, heirs in a wrongful death action,
were found to be bound by the decedent's agreement to arbitrate when the
contract specifically required that claims by "a member's heir or personal
representative" be arbitrated." 0 On the other hand, where there is no privity
of contract with the hospital, parties can still sue the hospital even if there is
an arbitration clause with the provider."'
D1I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION PROCESSES
1. Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitations were enacted in the 1970's as part of tort reform
legislation. These statutes were enacted to fix the problem of the "long tail"
in which claims for injuries are not immediately apparent and may not be ap-
parent for a number of years. The slowness of the claims development pro-
cess made it difficult to project claims experience, losses, and payouts." 2
Every state now has a statute of limitations that applies specifically to medi-
105. See Pietrelli v. Peacock, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688. 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
106. See Hilleary v. Garvin, 238 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (Cal. CL App. 1987).
107. See id.
108. See Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 821 (Cal. CL App. 1988).
109. See Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 849 (Cal. CL App. 1993).
110. See Herbert v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 447, 478 (Cal. Court. App 1999).
111. See Hollister v. Beazl, 83 Cal. Rptr 2d 903, 905 (Cal. Court. App. 1999).
112. See Peter Zablotsky, From a Whimper to a Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occur-
rence Based Statutes of Limitation Governing Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long La.
tency Periods Unconstitutional 1" 103 Dict. L REv. 455. 460 (1999).
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cal malpractice claims." 3 On the average, medical malpractice statutes of lim-
itations are about two years. Typically, they run from the date of the occur-
rence of the negligence, date of discovery, or date of discovery with
maximum time from occurrence." 4
Provisions which have been found to be unconstitutional are those with a
maximum time from occurrence because the right to sue could be precluded
before the plaintiff has a chance to discover the wrong.115 States which have
held occurrence based statutes of limitations unconstitutional are New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Texas also indicated the
possibility of doing So. 116 These statutes have been held as unconstitutional
violations of equal protection, due process, or access to court clauses of the
United States or individual state constitutions. "7 The equal protection chal-
lenges arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which states
that no state can deny any person equal protection of the law." 8 There are
two primary challenges to the equal protection clause in regards to medical
malpractice statutes of limitation. The first is that medical negligence plain-
tiffs are treated differently than plaintiffs for other negligence."19 The second
is that different types of medical malpractice victims may be treated differ-
ently when discovery based statutes have exceptions for "foreign objects,
continuous treatment, or fraudulent concealment."' 20 Courts have found that
when a statute treats medical malpractice plaintiffs differently because of
these exceptions, then the statute is an unconstitutional violation of equal pro-
tection because the statutes are not rationally related to the legitimate state in-
terest involved.' 2'
The due process challenges arise under the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution which requires that no state may deprive a person of "life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."' 22 In the context of the statutes of limi-
tations, due process procedural protections requiring someone to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful way can be balanced against other so-
cial interests to limit the time within which a claim can be asserted. 23 Courts
113. See id.
114. See id. at 461.
115. See id. at 456.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
119. See Zablotsky, supra note 109, at 468.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 474.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. See Zablotsky, supra note 109, at 484.
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have generally found that statutes of limitations that expire before the plaintiff
has a chance to discover the injury are unconstitutional. 24 Other states have
interpreted the statute of limitations in a way to avoid finding the statute un-
constitutional by finding that injury occurred after the occurrence of the mal-
practice.125 In California, the statute of limitation for arbitration is the same as
that covering written contracts generally for a period of four years. 126 There-
fore, a medical malpractice lawsuit would need to be filed within the time
frame for tort litigation, but arbitration proceedings could wait for four years
to be filed. 27
2. Prelitigation Panels
Twenty-five states have implemented a prelitigation process that includes
a prelitigation panel. While the exact name and function of the panels vary
from state to state, generally they have been established by statute to provide
for early case screening through discovery and fact finding and early neutral
evaluation analysis that can include standard of care, liability, and damage is-
sues. The panels often include a physician who can serve as an expert in de-
termining the standard of care as part of the panel process. Panels have been
implemented in efforts to encourage early resolution of claims, reduction of
litigation costs, and lower malpractice premiums.12 Critics of the pre-trial
screening panels contend that they are not effective, non-binding, and add an-
other administrative layer to court proceedings resulting in increased costs.'-
Prelitigation panels function in different ways in different states.'" The
panels primarily either serve an expert function in reviewing the case and de-
termining whether there is a negligent breach of the standard of care or in the
role of non-binding early neutral evaluation to promote settlement. Upon
agreement of the parties, the decision of the panel can become binding. Three
states provide for panel mediation of claims. Washington provides for
124. See i.
125. Id. at 493.
126. See Meyer v. Carnoue, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617 (Cal. CL App. 1986). (Shepardize)
127. Cerney, supra note 15, at 204.
128. Zukher, supra note 5, at 150.
129. Id.
130. The states which have prelitigation panels are: Alaska, Connecticut. Dela ame, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland. Massachu.etts, Michigan, Montana.
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah. Vermont. and Virginia.
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mandatory mediation of health care claims.' 3' The statute of limitations is
tolled until the mediation is complete and the case can still go to trial. 3 2 In
'Wisconsin, mediation panels are available for health care providers and fami-
lies. The statute of limitations is again tolled until the mediation is complete
or mediation may be requested within 154 days of filing the complaint.'33 In
North Carolina, all civil cases are required to participate in a mediated settle-
ment within 120-180 days of filing the law suit.' 4 Wyoming has declared its
panel to be unconstitutional. In 1988, the Wyoming Supreme Court declared
the Medical Review Panels for medical malpractice to be an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection. 35
Some prelitigation panels serve an expert role in determining liability
with the determination resulting in admissibility in court. In Alaska, a three
member expert panel prepares a written report to the court that is admissible
as expert testimony at trial. 36 The Connecticut screening panel comprised of
one attorney and two doctors is voluntary. If convened, the panel will review
and determine liability which decision in admissible in court. 137 In Delaware,
a mandatory malpractice review panel gives advice to the court on whether
evidence supports a breach of the standard of care. A negative panel opinion
is "prima facie" evidence of negligence, but is not conclusive. Panel mem-
bers are protected from testifying in court and the court itself can strike down
the panel opinion. 38 In Indiana, a medical review panel is convened for medi-
cal malpractice claims that exceed $15,000. The panel consists of one attor-
ney and three health care providers who serve as experts in reviewing the
medical situation. The decision of the Indiana Medical Review Panel is ad-
missible at trial, but is not conclusive of fault. 39 In Kansas, the Kansas Medi-
cal Screening Panel report is admissible at trial and panel members may serve
as witnesses. 140 Maryland's Arbitration Panel in the Health Claims Arbitration
Offices determines the liability of the parties and then apportions damages if
needed. Parties can reject the panel decision, but panel recommendations are
131. Michigan also provides for a Mediation Panel. However, the Michigan Panel func-
tions by holding a hearing and evaluating the merits of the lawsuit so that it acts more like an
arbitration panel than a mediation panel. See MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 27-6-105 & § 27-6-701.
132. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100.
133. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 655.445.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1.
135. See Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 783 (,Vyo. 1988).
136. See ALAS. STAT. § 09.55.535.
137. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38A-36.
138. See DEL CODE ANN. 18 §68003, 6811. 6812, 6853.
139. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 TO 34-18-8-6.
140. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4904. ,
20
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol1/iss1/6
[Vol. 1: 45, 2000]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
admissible in court141 Massachusetts requires a Tribunal Review by a judge,
physician and attorney with the panel findings admissible at trial."42 The Ne-
braska Medical Review Panel meets prior to filing a lawsuit and tolls the stat-
ute of limitations. The panel determines the standard of care, and decisions
are non-binding, but are admissible in court. The Virginia Medical Malprac-
tice Review Panel holds a hearing on the standard of care and issues a non-
binding decision. The panel opinion is admissible as evidence and the panel
members can serve as witnesses. Parties also have the option of binding
arbitration. 43
Other prelitigation panels serve as non-binding early neutral evaluation
to encourage early settlement of the case without the panel decision being ad-
missible in court. Hawaii requires that a Conciliation Panel meet prior to the
filing of a lawsuit to review the case and issue an advisory opinion on negli-
gence liability and damages. Parties can reject the recommendations of the
panel and sue in court.'" Idaho requires that the Idaho Board of Medicine
convene a hearing panel prior to filing a lawsuit. However, the proceeding is
informal, nonbinding, and inadmissible in court'145 Louisiana gives parties the
choice of a review by a Medical Review Panel or an arbitration proceeding.145
In Maine, the Prelitigation Screening panel meets prior to a lawsuit being
filed. However, the panel can be waived or enforced by agreement of the par-
ties.' 47 Michigan convenes a Mediation Panel that holds a hearing and evalu-
ates the situation including the standards of care.Ys In Montana, either a Med-
ical Legal Panel convenes prior to filing a lawsuit or arbitration can be held
to determine the evidence available, whether malpractice occurred, and the
extent of the injury. The Montana Panel decision is not binding or admissible
in court. 149 The Nevada screening panel determines injury or malpractice
before the parties can file suit. If the panel determines that malpractice oc-
curred, a mandatory settlement conference is held to determine the value of
the claim. The decision of the settlement court is non-binding, but requires
141. See MID. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02.
142. See lAss. ANN. LAws 231 § 60B.
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-5811
144. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 671-12.
145. See ID.,o CODE § 6-1001 TO 1-11.
146. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.57.
147. See Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. 24 § 2851 - 2857.
148. See Mica. CooP. LAws ANN. § 600.4915.
149. See MoNr. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105 TO 27-6-701.
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payment of costs to the other party if a smaller amount is awarded at trial.'5
New Mexico's Medical Review Commission decisions are not binding and
not admissible in court.'5' The Ohio voluntary arbitration board renders non-
binding inadmissible opinions.5 2 The South Dakota Panel must determine lia-
bility, and if liability is found, the panel has thirty days to determine dam-
ages.153 In Utah a Prelitigation Panel determines the merit of the case. The
decision is non-binding and inadmissible in court. However, parties may
waive the panel or convert to binding arbitration by agreement.'- 4 The Ver-
mont arbitration panel convenes before trial and the decision of the panel can
be binding by agreement of the parties.' 5 5 Pre-trial screening panels have been
criticized as another administrative hurdle that comes too early in the process
to be effective. 156
3. Arbitration Statutes
All fifty states have general arbitration statutes based on the Uniform Ar-
bitration Act. '57 The Uniform Arbitration Statutes are based upon the Uni-
form Arbitration Model Act which has been adopted with variations in each
of the states. The Model Arbitration Act generally provides for the validity of
written agreements to arbitrate. The court has jurisdiction to review proceed-
150. See NEe. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41A.059.
151. See N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-15.
152. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21.
153. See S. D. § 21-25B-1 TO 21-25B-26.
154. See UTAH CODE ANN. 78-14-8 TO 78-14-12.
155. See VT. STAT. ANN. 12 § 7002.
156. See Metzloff, supra note 4, at 217.
157. GENERAL ARBrrRATION STATUTES FOR EACH STATE. ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to -16 (1993);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 to .180 (Michie 1998); Amtz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518
(West 1994); ARK. CODE. ANN. § § 16-180-101 to -107 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE:
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -223 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424 (West
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 5701-5725 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV, STAT. §§ 658-1 to -15
(1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1998); 710 ILL COMp. STAT. ANN, 5118 (West 1999); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-57-1-1 to -26 (Michie 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1 - .19 (West 1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 to -422 (1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.045 to .160 (Michie 1992);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201 to :4217 (West 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit. 14 §§ 5927-5949
(West 1980); Mo. Code Ann., Arbitration § 3-201 to -234 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
251, §§ 1-12 (West 1981); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-15035 (West 1994); MIN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 572.08 to .30 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1997); NED. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 25-7601 to -2622 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1.567.188.20 (1996); N.D.
CaNT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 (1998); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 §§ 801-818 (1998); 42. PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 215-48-10 to -240; TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 (1997); T)x. Civ. ST. CODE ANN. §§ 224 to 238-6 (West 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to -18 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 5651-5681 (1997); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-581.016 (Michie 1998); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (Michie 1998).
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ings to compel or stay arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. When
an agreement goes to arbitration, there is a period of discovery, followed by
an arbitration hearing. Parties may be represented by an attorney if they so
desire. Parties, by application, can request that an arbitration award be modi-
fied. Arbitration awards are typically upheld unless there is demonstrated
fraud, impartiality, the arbitrator exceeded his authority, or other limited
grounds. A court entered award is given the same force as any other judg-
ment.'58 The adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in a state provides stat-
utory framework favoring arbitration. Any medical malpractice arbitration
could take place under the Uniform Arbitration Act enacted in any of the
states by complying with any specific provisions of the statute within that
state. Some states have also enacted medical malpractice specific arbitration
statutes. These statutes provide a more specific framework for arbitration in
the medical malpractice context. These state statutes are discussed in more
detail below.
Michigan was the first state to establish medical malpractice arbitration
by statute.' 59 The ichigan statutes provided for voluntary arbitration by a
three person panel chosen from an advisory committee comprised of public
member, health care professionals, and attorneys 16 The process included no-
tice to patients of their option to arbitrate medical malpractice claims. During
a thirteen year period only 847 Malpractice disputes out of a pool of 20,000
claims were arbitrated.' 6' When statutory arbitration requirements were met,
the court presumed the validity of the arbitration agreement unless the party
challenging the agreement could show reasons not to enforce the agree-
ment' 62 The arbitration agreement was upheld because the form and content
complied with the statute even though there was no indication that informa-
tion about the arbitration agreement had been given the patient and he was
158. The Uniform Arbitration Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1995, amended in 1956, and approved by the House of Dllegates of
the American Bar Association on August 25, 1955 and August 30. 1956. http.l/Asis-adrkorg.
159. In 1975, the Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act also included restrictions
on expert witness qualification, damage caps, and use of a mediation panel in a role similar to
other pre-litigation panels. These provisions were tightened in 1993 with revised limits and ex-
ceptions on damage caps and modified terms of voluntary agreements. See MLc. CoM,. LAws
ANN. § § 600.5040-600.5065 (repealed 1993); See also MICL Cotu. LAws Ate,; § 600.2912g(1)
(1993).
160. MicH. Co.ip. LAw AN. § 600.5040 (West 1993) Now repealed.
161. Arbitration Potential, supra note 4, at 203.
162. McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, et aL 405 N.W.2d 88 (Mich 1987).
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simply given the agreement to sign without explanation. 63 Generally, courts
have favored arbitration and have enforced arbitration agreements which do
not meet the statutory requirements.T 6 However, a recent Michigan court of
appeals case found a medical malpractice arbitration agreement unenforce-
able for not complying with the statutory purpose of including provisions re-
garding how and who could revoke the arbitration clause.165
In 1993, the Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act was re-
pealed' 6 and more stringent damage caps and modified voluntary arbitration
agreements were enacted. 67 Michigan later established a mediation award
panel that functioned similar to an arbitration panel168 This panel determined
the amount of the award which the parties could accept or reject. A study of
the Michigan Mediation panel award process found that the mediation awards
were generally higher than settlement payments and trial awards, the awards
did not tend to be erratic, and actual negligence had an impact on accepting
mediation awards. 69
The Alabama Medical Liability Act provides for settlement of medical
liability disputes by arbitration. The act applies to physicians, dentists, medi-
cal institutions, and other health care providers and specifically indicates that
American Arbitration Association rules will be followed. 70 Alaska specifi-
cally provides for the voluntary arbitration of malpractice actions if certain
contract formalities are met. It also indicates that the arbitration agreement
cannot be a prerequisite of treatment. While Alaska has a statute to promote
private arbitration of medical malpractice claims, there is no indication that
any malpractice cases have been arbitrated under it.171
California and Colorado have notice provisions. California requires the
first article of the contract to state
163. Id. at 96.
164. Haywood v. Fowler, 475 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
165. Kosmyna v. Botsford Community Hospital, 607 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), In
this case the arbitration agreement indicated that the person has 60 days after hospitalization to
revoke the arbitration agreement in writing. However, the agreement did not indicate that a legal
representative of the person can cancel, nor did it indicate that the hospital could cancel the
agreement. Because the agreement did not meet the statutory purpose it was held to be
unenforceable.
166. Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN §
600.5040.5065 (1993), now repealed, and Michigan Uniform Arbitration Act at MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5001 - 5035.
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912g.
168. Walter Orlando Simmons, An Economic Analysis of Mandatory Mediation and the
Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 6 1. LEa. ECON. 41, 42 (1996).
169. Id. at 66-68.
170. Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-485 (1975).
171. Arbitration Potential, supra note 4, at 203, at 204.
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It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any mcd-
ical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were im-
properly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbi-
tration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process
except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both par-
ties to this contract, by entering into it are giving up their constitutional right to have any
such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of
arbitration."2
Before the signature line in 10-point bold red type the notice should say:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY
ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION
AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL SEE
ARTICLE 2 OF THIS CONTRACT."'
The California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) also in-
cluded a $250,000 non-economic damage cap, collateral source reductions,
short statute of limitations, and limits on attorneys fees. 74 The California stat-
ute gives parties thirty days to revocate the arbitration agreement. t75 The
MICRA statute did reduce medical malpractice premiums between 1975 and
1 9 9 1 .*76
4. Arbitration Practices
In 1997, the California Supreme Court decided Engalla v. Permanente.'1
This involved a young man who came in during a several year period with
respiratory and other lung problems. No diagnostic tests were performed.
Eventually, an x-ray was performed and he was diagnosed with lung cancer.
By then it was inoperable.'17 Pursuant to an arbitration agreement, petitioner
gave notice of intent to arbitrate. They also gave notice that petitioner's con-
dition was terminal and that this needed to be resolved expediently. This was
172. MICRA, CaL Civil Proc. Code §1295 (1999).
173. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1295(a) (1999).
174. MICRA contingency fee limitation Cal. Bus & Prof. Code s 6146 (West 1993). collat-
eral source benefits Cal. Civ Code 3333.1 , $250.000 noneconomic damage cap s 3333.2 statute
of limitations 340.5, arbitration requirements s1295.
175. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1295(c )(1999).
176. Cemy, supra note 15, at 194.
177. Engalla v. The Perrmanente Medical Group Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (1997).
178. Id. at 909.
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the end of May.7 9 It took until October for the parties to agree on the panel
of three arbitrators. Kaiser was involved in a variety of stalling and delay tac-
tics that including picking an arbitrator they knew would not be available un-
til November, not facilitating selection of the arbitrator, etc. The day after the
arbitrator was selected, the petitioner died. 80 A lawsuit was filed in the court
requesting that the arbitration agreement be unenforceable and claiming fraud,
duress, and waiver of enforcement based on the actions of Kaiser in interfer-
ing with the arbitration process. The California Supreme Court reiterated the
public policy encouraging arbitration, but indicated that there were times,
such as the procedural abuses in the Kaiser case, when arbitration could not
be enforceable.' 8'
Following the case, Kaiser put together a panel to consider how to re-
solve the problem. 182 They recommended an independent administrator to ad-
minister the program on behalf of Kaiser.83 Kaiser contracted with a small 15
person law firm who administers the arbitration through AAA processes. 1
84
Following the Kaiser case, the American Arbitration Association, American
Medical Association and American Bar Association formed a Committee
which recommended Due Process Protocols to ensure fairness in alternative
dispute resolution processes.'8 There has also been consumer protection legis-
lation and discussion at both the state and national level.
86
Maine Medical Association began a five year medical malpractice exper-
iment in 1992. The Maine statute required a State committee to establish
practice guidelines for anesthesia, emergency medicine and obstetrics and
gynecology. Physician can choose to participate in the program through use
of the practice guidelines. If sued for malpractice, then the lawsuit will be
dismissed if the physician can prove compliance with the practice guidelines.
The proposal was to be effective only if a majority of the physicians in the
three specialties choose to participate.8 7
179. Id. at 910.
180. Id at 914.
181. Id. at 927.
182. Kaiser Appoints Panel to Oversee Arbitration Program in California, 6 HEALTH CAPX
POL'Y REP. 18 (BNA), 763 (1998).
183. Kaiser Should Create Independent Arbitration Administrator, Panel Says, 7 HALTII
L. REP. 2 (BNA) 54 (1998).
184. See id
185. Consumer Due Process Protocol: Statement of Principles of the National Consumer
Dispute Advisory Committee, 10, April 1, 1998 http://www.adr.org.
186. Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilityies: Chapter 7: Complaints and Appeals,
Presidential Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Indus-
try, Report to the President of the United States (1997).
187. James Ludlam, The Real World of Malpratice Tort Reform Part 11, 33 Hosp. L. 12,
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5. Damage Limits
Limitations on non-economic damages have been established in some
states as a way to maximize jury verdicts so that there is more consistency
among awards.188 The damage caps provide guidelines for the jury to prevent
arbitrary awards with wide differences in verdicts for similarly situated plain-
tiffs.' t 9  Twenty-five states have damages caps in place for damages.'19
An early study found that by 1978 statutory damage caps had decreased the
rise in claim severity.191 The Florida courts have specifically upheld the statu-
tory non-economic damage caps in the arbitration setting. In University v.
Echarte, the court found that the agreement to arbitrate with limitations on
damages did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional right to access to the
courts. The need to control medical malpractice insurance premiums was seen
as a legitimate reason to cap damages.' 92 These damage caps were challenged
as constitutional violations of the right to access to the courts, right to trial by
jury, equal protection guarantees, and procedural and substantive due process.
The court relied on public policy favoring damage caps and use of arbitra-
tion.193 Sixteen states do not have any damage caps.' Critics of damage caps
claim that they are unresponsive to individual cases and unjustly limit recov-
ery in individual cases. 95
Nine states have declared damage caps as unconstitutional under differ-
353, 363.
188. Zukher, supra note 5, at 147.
189. Id.
190. The states which have damage caps include Alaska, California. Colorado. Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland. Massachusetts (there is an
exception for showing of loss or impairment of body function which is relatively easy to prove),
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey. Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
191. Patricia J. Chupkovich, Statutory Caps: An Involntaly Contribution to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining Affordable Health
Care?. 9 J. Corri.M H. L & POL'Y 337, 342 (1993).
192. University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
193. See .
194. The states that have damage caps include Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dzlaame,
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, South
Carolina, Vermont, Wyoming. See Patricia Chupkovich, Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribu-
tion to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for obtaining Af-
fordable Health Care?, 9 J. Cowrmap. H. L & PoL'Y 337 (1993).
195. Zukher, supra note 5, at 147.
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ent theories. 196 Equal protection is the most common ground for challenge to
the damage caps. 197 The argument is that statutes violate the equal protection
clause because the damage limits discriminate between more severely injured
persons and less severely injured person as well as discriminate between med-
ical malpractice plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs.'98 Others have challenged
the constitutionality of damages as a violation of due process rights. "In re-
viewing statutory caps under substantive due process, courts consistently ap-
ply a reasonableness test: Whether the legislation is reasonably related to a
proper legislative goal and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory." 199 Other
challenges have claimed that damage caps violate the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial because the caps limit the ability of the jury to determine
the outcome of the trial through determination of damages. 2°° Other chal-
lenges are based on "open courts" provisions that guarantee access to the
court.
20 o
A recent study of the effects of damage caps on pretrial settlement rates
gave paired negotiation subjects facts with which to negotiate a settlement.
Some of the pairs were given damage caps and others were not. The study
found that damages caps increase the settlement rate by reducing uncertainty
about the predicted trial outcome.202 Further, while both parties to the negotia-
tion had self-serving beliefs about the trial outcome, the damage caps reduced
the difference between the biases.203 Plaintiffs and defendants incorporated the
cap into their decision-making in different ways. While defendants used caps
to lower trial predictions, plaintiffs used caps to generate higher trial predic-
tions. Finally, fairness considerations played an important role in pretrial
bargaining.20 4
196. Nine states that have held damage caps to be unconstitutional include Alabama, Illi-
nois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See
Chupkovich, supra note 190.
197. Chupkovich, supra note 190, at 351.
198. States which have help damage caps unconstitutional based on equal protection in-
clude New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Idaho. See Mary Ann Willis, Limitation on Recovery
of Damages Medical Malpractice Cases: A Violation of Equal Protection? 54 U. CtN. L, Rev.
1329, 1338 (1986).
199. Courts in Ohio and Kansas have found that statutory caps violate substantive due pro-
cess. See Chupkovich, supra note 190, 337, 351.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 359-75.
202. Linda Babcock and Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Ap-
proach, 24 J. LecAL STUD. 341, 363 (1999)
203. Id. at 364.
204. Id. at 367.
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6. Award Reportability
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) of 1986 requires
reporting of medical malpractice awards to the National Practitioner Data
Base (NPDB). Liability insurers are required to report all malpractice pay-
ments made on behalf of doctors whether through jury verdict, arbitration
award, or settlement. The intent was to create a database that could be ac-
cessed by Medical Boards, hospital staff privileging entities, and managed
care organizations and others seeking information about physician qualifica-
tions as part of quality of care monitoring and credentialing decision
making.2 6
Hospitals, managed care organizations, and other interested parties can
access the data base to find out about a physician's malpractice award his-
tory.3  These awards are then used for credentialing of physicians by hospi-
tals and HMOs to decide if the doctor should be included in their network or
have privileges at their hospital.203
Mandatory reporting can make physician hesitant to settle lawsuits and
can encourage them to fight to protect their good name since even a settle-
ment in which there is no liability will be reported.2 Some states specifically
require reporting of malpractice verdicts and awards to the State Board of
Medicine.210 The states then prepare a physician profile that includes informa-
tion about the physician that can be used to compare pmctioners. : ' In Ari-
zona, the Board of Medical Examiners collects information including medical
malpractice judgments and awards to prepare a profile that is publicly dissem-
inated.2n The malpractice information must include the following statement:
The Settlement of a medical malpractice action may occur for a variety of reasons that do
not necessarily reflect negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the doctor.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 11134.
206. Weiler Malpractice Tail, supra note 11, at 1168.
207. Arbitration Potential, supra note 4, at 205.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. States that require reporting include Arizona. at A.R.S. § 32-1403.01; Massachusetts,
at M.G.L.A. 112 § 5; New Jersey, at NJ. Stat. § 17:30D-17 (1999); Tennessee. at T.C.A. § 63-
51-105; and Rhode Island, at R.IL 5-37-9.2.
211. Massachusetts, at M.G.LA. 112 § 5 (1999) and Tennessee, at T.C.A. § 63-51-105.
212. A.R.S. § 32-1403.01(A) (1999).
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A payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action does not create a presumption
that medical malpractice occurred.
213
Rhode Island also requires similar language to be included with public
dissemination or data.214 Rhode Island also requires malpractice data to be ac-
companied by (1) an explanation of the fact that physicians treating certain
types of patients and performing certain procedures are more likely to be the
subject of litigation than others (2) a statement that ten years worth of infor-
mation is included (3) an explanation that an incident can occur a long time
before malpractice awards are actually decided (4) an explanation of the im-
pact of treating high-risk patients on the medical malpractice history and (5)
an explanation that claims may be settled for reasons other than liability and
are sometimes made by the insurer without the physicians consent.
215
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was established to promote and en-
courage arbitration. This federal act is valid. The act states that
A written provision of any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or any agreement in writing to sub-
mit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction , or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and unenforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
216
The Supreme Court in interpreting the FAA has established that the FAA is
substantive rather than procedural law that was enacted pursuant to the power
of congress to regulate interstate commerce. 2 7 FAA preempts state law when
interstate commerce is effected to the extent that state law is inconsistent with
the FAA or stands as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress. 28
In 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Doctor's Associates v.
213. A.R.S. § 32-1403.01(A)(4) (1999).
214. R.I. 5-37-9.2 (1998).
215. R.I. 5-37-9.2 (a)(1)(G), (1998).
216. 9 U.S.C. §2 (West 1999).
217. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). See also Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 4003--05 (1967).
218. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. V. Mercury Constr. Corop., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also Volt Info Sciences, Inc. v. Board
of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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Casarotto case.219 In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed a Montana stat-
ute which required that arbitration clauses be printed on the first page of a
contract in underlined capital letters. The Court found that the statute placed
specific requirements on arbitration clauses and conditioned enforcement of
provisions on compliance with these requirements which were not applicable
to contracts generally. This state statutory treatment of arbitration clauses dif-
ferently than other standard contract language was inconsistent with the
FAA.3 Although FAA preempts state law where the two conflict, state sub-
stantive law regarding the use of arbitration clauses can still be formed by the
states.221 For example, Doctor's Associates case indicates that the determina-
tion of whether a contract is unconscionable under state law is appropriate
without contravening the FAA.rn It leaves open the question of whether stat-
utes such as the California code with specific arbitration contract drafting re-
quirements similar to those in the Doctor's Association case would be pre-
empted by FAA.
Similarly, the Colorado Court found the Colorado Health Care Availabil-
ity Act with provisions setting forth specific language for the medical arbitra-
tion clause was preempted by the FAA which requires that an arbitration
clause in a contract involving commerce is revocable only on the grounds ap-
plicable to contracts generally.2 4
2. Enterprise Liability & ERISA
Enterprise liability refers broadly to the theories that courts have used to
hold hospitals or health plans liable for medical malpractice.P With managed
care cost containment incentives, the financial incentives on physicians to
control costs may also create incentives to limit quality of care. This can lead
to health care with increased malpractice liability.P There are also more peo-
ple involved in health care decision-making including financial coverage deci-
219. Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
220. l at 1652, 1657.
221. Rolph, supra note 18, at 165.
222. Doctors Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996).
223. Rolph, supra note 18, at 166.
224. Morrison v. Colorado Permanente Medical Group P.C. 983 F. Supp. 937 (1997).
225. Zukher, supra note 5, at 151.
226. Gary T. Schwartz, Symposium: Afedical Malpractice, Tort. Contract. and Managed
Care 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 885 (1998).
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sions.227 When a physicians is employed by the hospital or health plan, the
theory of respondeat superior is used to establish direct liability.228 Under this
theory, the plaintiff must establish "(a) malpractice of the physician or other
provider, (b) the existence of an employment relationship between the MCO
(managed care organization) and the provider, and (c) that the provider was
acting in the scope of his employment or agency in negligently administering
medical services."2 29 Respondeat Superior has also been extended to non-
employed physicians under a theory of vicarious liability when the hospital or
health plan exercises control over the affiliated physician. 0
When the physician has independently contracted to provide services for
the hospital or health plan, vicarious liability can also be established through
the theory of actual or ostensible agency or agency by estoppel.231 This theory
was initially applied to hold hospitals liable for in-house physicians such as
radiologists, pathologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency room physicians,
but has since expanded to include other specialties as well.23 In order to
prove liability for an affiliated physician, the plaintiff must show "(1) an
MCO [Managed Care Organization] holds out the affiliated physician as its
employee, and (2) a patient looks to the MCO, rather than the individual phy-
sician, for medical care." 233 When the hospital or health plan "hold out" that
the practitioner is affiliated with the organization and the consumer "relies
on" this in receiving care, then the health care organization becomes liable
for the actions of its ostensible agent. 4
About one-half of the states use one of these theories to hold hospitals,
health maintenance organization (HMO), managed care organization (MCO)
liable for medical malpractice. About one-fourth of the states recognize the
theory but haven't applied it yet. Another one-fourth of the states have not
addressed or deny the theory. Kansas has a statute that specifically denies en-
terprise liability.
If enterprise liability has been shown, then the medical malpractice
claims could potentially be subject to arbitration if the hospital at the time of
treatment had the patient sign an arbitration agreement or if the health plan
227. Rolph, supra note 18, at 153.
228. Zukher, supra note 5, at 151.
229. Id.
230. J. Bradley Buckhalter, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims: Can Man-
aged Care Organizations Avoid Vicarious Liability? 22 SEATrLE UNtv. L. R. 1165, 1167 (1999).
231. Zukher, supra note 5, at 151.
232. Roger N. Braden and Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding the
Evolution-Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. Ky. L. REv. 675, 683 (1998).
233. Buckhalter, supra note 226, at 1165.
234. Zukher, supra note 5, at 151.
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had an arbitration agreement in its contract. In Oklahoma, for example, the
Supreme Court found that an HMO could not compel a plaintiff to arbitrate
claims, even though the subscriber agreement had a mandatory arbitration
clause. The court found the HMO's health services contract was excluded
from coverage under Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration Act which excluded ar-
bitration for "insurance except those contracts between insurance companies".
The court found that the HMO's functions were similar to health insurance
and therefore covered by the statutory exclusion.Ys A model arbitration clause
that complied with the Michigan Uniform Arbitration Act was recently pro-
posed for managed care organizations. It says:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Managed Care Organization
contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration pro-
cess will be administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Health Care
Claim Settlement Procedures, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrators may
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The controversy or claim will be sub-
mitted to arbitration upon the written demand of one of the parties directed to the other
party. The arbitration process shall commence within the following time frames: acute
emergencies - 24 hours; general emergencies - 72 hours: non-emergencies - 45 days.
Three (3) arbitrators will be selected, within ten (10) days of notice to the AAA of the
existence of the dispute. If either of the parties fails to agree to any of the arbitrators
named, the AAA shall advance on-half of the AAA fees that are operative at the time of
filing; the opposing party will pay the remainder. By signing this agreement you are
agreeing to have any dispute regarding health care coverage decided by the aforemen-
tioned arbitrators and you are giving up your right to a court or jury trial. This agreement
to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment and it may be revoked by the
member or his legal representative within sixty (60) days after execution by notifying the
MCO in writing.23
The provisions are drafted with the intent to comply with FAA provisions as
well as the more uniform arbitration act in Michigan. -
Different actions have been taken to reduce enterprise liability. A
Harvard Medical School Anesthesia study was performed in the mid 1980's
because Harvard anesthesia premiums were among the highest in the country
for any specialty. The study found that the previous lawsuits were valid and a
result of patient injuries that could have been avoided. The focus was on de-
velopment of new procedures and technologies to avoid similar lawsuits in
235. Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235. 1239 (1993).
236. Aimee E. Bierman, A Modest Proposal: Model Arbitration Provisions in the Age of
Managed Care, 45 Wayne L Rev. 173 (1999).
237. Id. at 181.
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the future. These procedures and technologies to reduce medical negligence
were implemented on a mandated basis. It was found that anesthesia-related
mishaps had dropped and that malpractice premiums for the group had been
cut in half. 238 Enterprise liability may provide more of an opportunity to
"improve the process" within the health care setting that led the adverse
claim. 239
Even if enterprise liability can be proven in the state where the malprac-
tice arises, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) creates
another hurdle to enforceability of liability in court. ERISA governs employee
benefit plans (EBP) that are put in place pursuant to ERISA. 240 These em-
ployee welfare plans include any plan put in place to provide medical or
other health benefits for employees or their beneficiaries through the purchase
of insurance or otherwise.241 The purpose of ERISA was to allow multi-state
employers the ability to provide uniform benefits to their employees without
complying with specific and different state law provisions. 242 As part of this
federal uniformity, ERISA pre-empts any claims made in state court and
gives the federal district court exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA claims. 243
Preemption can occur under two provisions of the act. The first provides
for complete preemption. Complete preemption arises when a well-pleaded
compliant raises issues of federal law. This federal law question creates fed-
eral question jurisdiction subject to removal by the defendant to federal
court.244 The defendant cannot raise a federal defense to create federal juris-
diction, but must rely on the claims raised by plaintiff.245 The complete pre-
emption doctrine is less an issue of preemption than of federal law jurisdic-
tion over the claim. If federal legislation, such as ERISA, has characterized a
claim as a federal law claim, then federal subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Whether the plaintiff complies with the well-pleaded complaint rule or not,
the defendant can remove the case to federal court and raise a federal law
defense.246
238. Weiler Malpractice Tail, supra note 11, at 1186.
239. Id. at 1188.
240. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et, seq. [Here-
inafter ERISA]
241. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(1).
242. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company, 514 U.S. 645 (1995). [Hereinafter, Travelers],
243. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
245. Buckhalter, supra note 226, at 1169.
246. Id. at 1170.
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With ERISA, the court looks at whether the plaintiff is attempting to
"recover benefits" or "clarify rights to future benefits" under the plan. In
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, the court held that the quality of benefit issues
such as negligence are not preempted while quantity of benefit decisions such
as denial of services were preempted by ERISA. This case involved a claim
of enterprise liability under the theory of ostensible agency.247 When the court
must interpret the employee benefit plan terms to determine the state law
claim, then complete preemption applies and the case is removed to federal
court. On the other hand, if the court can resolve the state law claim without
look at the benefit plan contract, then there is no federal preemption and state
court remedies apply.241 This becomes important because different remedies
are available in different courts. ERISA specifically limits remedies to civil
enforcement provisions to recover benefits due or enforce rights under the
plan.249 Remedies such as punitive damages are not available under ERISA.2°
Even if complete preemption does not apply in an ERISA case, conflict
preemption under § 514 (a) may still apply.25 Section 514 states that ERISA
supercedes "state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan",252 Numerous courts have reviewed whether a benefit
plan "relates to" an employer benefit plan. In Shav v. Delta AirLines, Inc.,
the Supreme Court interpreted the "relates to" provision of the act to find
that a law that has a "connection with or reference to" an employee benefit
plan "relates to" the plan. The court then found that a New York law which
forbade health plan discrimination because of pregnancy was preempted by
ERISA.213 The Supreme Court decided Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Company by looking at the purpose of ERISA to deter-
mine whether the state statute impacted the uniform benefit plan administra-
tion.35 The court found that an indirect economic impact on choice of insur-
ance did not trigger ERISA preemption because it did not preclude uniform
247. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 88 F. 3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
248. Id
249. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1)(B).
250. The statute indicates the Congresses purpose was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation
to permit national uniformity in administration of health plans. See Travelers, supra note 238, at
657.
251. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §1144(a).
252. Ld.
253. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
254. Travelers, supra note 238, at 645.
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administration of plan benefits.2 -5 Two 1997 Supreme Court cases narrowed
ERISA preemption by looking at (1) whether it was a traditional area of state
regulation (2) whether the state law specifically "relates to" ERISA areas of
concern and (3) reading preemption narrowly in traditional state substantive
law areas even if there is an indirect economic effect on the EBPR 6
While the ERISA preemption is broadly construed, the courts have be-
gun to "pierce" ERISA to allow for lawsuits in state court for "quality" of
care such as malpractice.257 Because the medical malpractice is a "quality" of
care issue, there can be a lawsuit under ERISA to hold the health plan liable
for medical malpractice if the enterprise liability is available in state court.258
For example, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, the plaintiffs alleged negligence on
behalf of the hospital and medical staff. The court found that complete pre-
emption did not apply because the lawsuit did not fall within the scope of
civil enforcement provisions for recovery of benefit or to enforce rights under
the planY 9 In Rice v. Panchal, the plaintiff sued both his physician and health
plan for medical malpractice under the theory of respondeat superior. The
court found that ERISA did not completely preempt the plaintiff's vicarious
liability medical malpractice claim. The court based its decision on the fact
that the civil enforcement provisions did not involve plan administration or
quality of benefits under the plan. There was also no need to refer to the EBP
to resolve the claim. 260 These cases indicate that complete preemption will not
apply when the claim can be resolved without looking at the terms of the
plan or quality issues arise that do not impact civil enforcement
proceedings. 26'
Courts have been more varied in their interpretation of conflict preemp-
tion cases under 514(a). While some courts interpret the "relates to" provi-
sions under 514(a) to find that indirect but substantial effect on employee
benefit plan can be sufficient to trigger preemption of a vicarious liability
claim to federal court. Thus, ERISA preempts the vicarious liability claim
filed against a health plan.262 On the other hand, some courts have interpreted
255. Id. at 659-660.
256. California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330
(1997); DeBuono v. NYSA - ILA Medical Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
257. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Plan, Inc., 88 F3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
258. Id.
259. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 88 E3d at 1482.
260. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d at 638-39 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Pacificare of Oklahoma,
Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 153 (10th Cir. 1995).
261. Buckhalter, supra note 226, at 1179.
262. Id. at 1180; See also, Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn.
1990).
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the "relates to" provisions to find that the indirect effect on administrative
procedures of a plan would not trigger ERISA preemption. Thus, the medical
malpractice claim did not "relate to" the benefit plan and there was not ER-
ISA preemption. The malpractice claim could be heard in state court" How-
ever, applying the three-prong analysis of the Travelers, Dillingham, and
DeBuono cases, conflict preemption may not occur for medical malpractice.
(1) Medical malpractice is a traditionally area of state law. (2) State vicarious
liability medical malpractice claims do not implicate an express area of ER-
ISA concern. (3) The indirect economic effect of vicarious liability medical
malpractice claims would not trigger ERISA conflict preemption.2
3. TeleMedicine, CyberMedicine, and CyberMalpractice
Telemedicine is "the use of advanced telecommunications technologies
to exchange health information and provide health care services across geo-
graphic, time, social and cultural barriers."' Telemedicine allow an interac-
tive televideo to transfer information to physicians at both ends of the com-
munication. The technology allows a physician to "see" the patient through
video technology.26 Telemedicine is often used to provide expertise which
may not be available in a more rural or other area where health care special-
ists are less available.2 Telemedicine is currently used with static imaging
whereby information is digitized and compressed to be transferred through the
telephone cables to produce images at the other end. Fiber-optic cables are
used to produce these images.2 68 Since states regulate the practice of
medicine, some states have amended their licensing statute to include the
practice of telemedicine or permit out of state license exceptions to those
from bordering states, those providing limited consultations, or emergency
services.269 Three proposals to lessen the burden of state licensure include: (1)
patients are considered to be "electronically transported" to the state of the
263. Id. at 1181; See also, Haas it Group Health Plan, 875 F. Supp. at 548.
264. Buckhalter, J. Bradley at 1183 - 1185.
265. Christopher J. Caryl, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Preventing the Development
of Telemedicine, 12 J.L & HEALTH 173, 174 (1997/1998).
266. Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cibermedicine, 25 AX J L
& MEr. 327 (1999).
267. Caryl, supra note 261, at 173.
268. Id.
269. Id at 176.
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consulting telephysician so that there is no new licensure requirement, (2)
create a national licensure system to regulate telemedicine or (3) adopt model
acts that require all physicians practicing telemedicine across state lines to ob-
tain a special purpose license for the specific purpose of practicing
telemedicine. 270 In terms of establishing the breach of the standard of care,
the question is the proper standard of care for telemedicine. The modem trend
towards a national standard of care would seem to fit the non-geographic na-
ture of telemedicine, but that has yet to be determined. The broader issues are
"choice of law" questions over which state law would decide when the doc-
tor and patient reside in different states. By contracting prior to services, con-
tracts could spell out these choice of law provisions and provide for private
proceedings such as arbitration as well.
Malpractice issues that arise from telemedicine are the same as arise
under standard malpractice cases. The plaintiff must prove that there is a
duty, the duty was breached, the breach was the proximate cause of injury,
and there was harm or damage.27' Courts have not yet established when the
patient-physician relationship is sufficiently established to create a duty. It has
been suggested that if the following elements are shown, a telemedicine con-
sult would have created a physician-patient relationships: (1) if the consultant
has met the patient or knows his name and (2) the consultant has examined
the patient's record and (3) the consultant examined the patient or (4) the
consultant accepts a fee for his services.272
Cybermedicine is defined in a broader way to include telemedicine and
all technology enabled interactions among health care providers and con-
sumer-patients. Cybermedicine includes "marketing, relationship creation, ad-
vice, prescribing and selling drugs and devices," and . . . other future activ-
ities.273 This definition of cybermedicine overstates those activities involved in
the usual practice of medicine to include any health related activity that may
incur liability through the internet. For purposes of this discussion,
cybermedicine will focus on those areas in which where the health care pro-
vider would be responsible for a negligent breach of a duty of care as op-
posed to strict liability issues from marketing, drug sales, or other health ac-
tivities where there is no provider-patient relationship.
While the practice of medicine has traditonally been a state law function,
the practice of cybermedicine can extend beyond state or national bounda-
270. Ld. at 189-191.
271. Id. at 195.
272. Id. at 196.
273. Terry, supra note 262, at 327.
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ties.274 This raises the question of the legitimacy and power of state govern-
ments to regulate such activities. 2 5 Of the trends in cybermedicine, web
based marketing of health care and health advice sites are primarily relevant
to medical malpractice liability.276 Web based marketing has the potential to
impact enterprise liability if marketing materials hold out that a provider is
affiliated with the hospital or health plan and the patient relys on this in
choosing health care.277 The issues of enterprise liability and ERISA preemp-
tion would then apply. The question that remains is the "choice of forum" to
determine which law applies when the issues arisesm This confusion of fo-
rum creates an ideal environment for the use of contract provision to specify
in advance which state law would apply and whether arbitration can be used
as a private means to resolve the dispute. By including contract language
specifying state law and use of arbitration, the health care enterprise can con-
trol the forum and privatize the proceedings.
Advice and content web sites include a broad range of interactive models
from the mere publishing of health care information on the internet to the
visit to a CyberDoc. The publishing of information or giving of generic ad-
vice would be similar to the duty owed by a book publisher who has no gen-
eral legal duty to investigate the accuracy and contents of the books it pub-
lishesY 9 On the other hand a cite like Cyberdoc that gives specific advice to
a specific individual may have created a patient-doctor relationship sufficient
to find a duty of care.m These are the more difficult cases because no one
knows whether a Cyberdoc vill "replace" the local physician in providing
health care or serve in the role of a "second opinion", triage center referring
to local practitioners, or source of information. To date, these services would
seem to serve the later role and will probably stay that way unless health
plans agree to reimburse cyberservices. This then raises questions of whether
on-line agreements are enforceable and where. Some have tried to manage
potential liability through internet disclaimers of liability or exculpatory state-
ments encouraging the person to still consult with a health care provider.~'
274. Id. at 329.
275. Id at 329.
276. Id. at 336.
277. Id. at 339.
278. Id. at 329.
279. Terry, Supra note 262, at 352.
280. I. at 350.
281. Id. at 360.
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V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INDUSTRY STANDARDS
1. American Arbitration Association (AAA)
The American Arbitration Association is non-profit corporation founded
in 1926. It specializes in business related arbitration. In 1992, the AAA estab-
lished Health Care Claims Settlement Procedures which establishes proce-
dures for health care settlement of disputes through mediation and arbitration.
Participation in the program is voluntary. The parties have the right to be rep-
resented by an attorney or non-attorney at any time. In 1997, it was reported
that there had been approximately 300 arbitration cases under the AAA
Health Care rules.28 2
AAA arbitration rules for health care claims provide for a panel of pro-
fessionals to serve as arbitrators. The party requesting the arbitration com-
pletes a request for arbitration form and filing fee. The opposing party has
ten days from the notice by AAA to file an answering statement. Any new or
different claim must be made in writing and filed with AAA with notice to
the other party before the arbitrator is appointed or with the arbitrators con-
sent. The opposing party has ten days to respond to a new claim. The parties
will be provided with a list of names of arbitrators from which to choose.
Parties have ten days to select an arbitrator and return the list to AAA. If par-
ties fail to agree on an arbitrator, AAA will select one. The arbitrator is re-
quired to disclose any conflict of interest. At the request of any party of the
AAA an administrative conference will be scheduled within ninety days of
the filing of the claim. The parties will exchange information at this prelimi-
nary hearing and establish the breadth of discovery. Notice of hearing shall be
sent ten days prior to the hearing and parties shall have the right to represen-
tation or the presence of an interpreter. The arbitrator has the discretion to al-
low or exclude the testimony of any witness at the hearing. At the hearing,
both parties will have the opportunity to present testimony, present witnesses,
and exhibits. There is no direct communication between the parties and arbi-
trator other than at the oral hearing. The arbitrator is the judge of the materi-
ality of information presented. The hearing may later be reopened on the arbi-
trator's initiative or for good cause. The arbitrator may grant any remedy or
relief deemed just and equitable within the scope of the agreement of the par-
ties. This award is delivered in writing to the parties. The AAA will furnish
written copies of the award to the party at his own expense as may be re-
quired in judicial proceedings relation to the arbitration. The AAA also pro-
282. Josef Rohlik, Symposium: Arbitration as a Model for Resolution of Health Care Dis.
putes, 41 ST. Louis L. J. 1005, 1013 (1997).
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vide for certain filing and processing fees. The filing fee for one arbitrator is
$500 .n
Mediation rules provide that the parties requesting the mediation to give
a brief statement regarding the nature of the dispute and provide this to the
other party and AAA. The parties will choose a mediator from the AAA
panel unless the parties cannot agree in which case AAA will appoint a quali-
fied mediator. A date time and place that is agreeable to the parties and the
mediator will be set. Ten days before the mediation session, the parties will
provide the mediator with a statement of their position. The mediator does
not have authority to impose a settlement, but helps them try to reach a satis-
factory resolution of the dispute. The mediation sessions are private and con-
fidential. There is not stenographic record made of the mediation. Parties
share the cost of compensating the mediator."-
2. American Health Lawyers Association
The American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) provides dispute
resolution services for health care industry disputes including disputes be-
tween providers and community members. It has established Rules of Proce-
dure for Arbitration and Mediation. Parties may request mediation, arbitration,
or med-arb in which the process begins as a mediation, then is completed as
an arbitration if the parties do not resolve the dispute.3
The rules provide for the process of arbitration unless the parties have
agreed othenvise by contract in which case the parties agreement will be fol-
lowed. The AHLA rules provide for an arbitrator to be selected from an arbi-
tration panel. One arbitrator decides the case unless the parties agree other-
wise. When there is more than one arbitrator and they are not all in
agreement, the majority decision will decide the case. 2 Unless otherwise
specified by contract, the parties will request and receive a list of seven arbi-
trators within ten days for a request. Each party may strike on name, then in-
dicate the order of preference for the remaining arbitrators. The person with
the lowest sum from the lists will be contacted to serve as arbitrator. If there
283. Health Care Claims Settlement Procedures. American Arbitration Association, Effec-
tive July 1, 1992, 5-13. lzttp:/Aviviadrorg..
284. Id. at 2-5.
285. Rules of Procedure for Mediation and Rules of Procedure for Arbitration. American
Health Lawyers Association, (1991).
286. l
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is a tie, the Service will select one of the arbitrators who has tied at random
and notify the parties. The arbitrator who is chosen will receive a notice of
appointment and will have ten days to respond. If the arbitrator fails to re-
spond within the specified time, the next name on the list will be used.287 The
arbitrator is required to disclose any conflicts of interest that would effect im-
partiality at the outset.28
Once the selection process is complete, the arbitrator or one of the par-
ties by request may schedule a preliminary hearing or preliminary teleconfer-
ence to consider any matters to expedite the process including schedule for
the production of documents, the identity of witnesses to be called and the
schedule for other discovery. Discovery can be allowed by the arbitrator as
necessary to ensure a full and fair presentation of the issues. The parties can
agree on a location for the arbitration hearing. If they cannot agree, it will be
held at the location indicated on the request for ADR form, or be determined
by the arbitrator.289 The arbitrator will provide notice of the set hearing time,
date, and place. Parties may be represented by counsel or other authorized
representative. If either party desires a stenographic record of the hearing,
they shall make arrangements and bear the costs of the stenography and give
notice to all other parties. The arbitrator can determine the propriety of any
person in attendance at the hearing. The hearing will include oral or written
statements of the parties to clarify information. Witness can be presented to
support the claim. The arbitration can proceed even if a party who has re-
ceived notice fails to appear. The arbitrator has discretion regarding evidence
to be admitted during the proceeding. Once the hearing has completed, the ar-
bitrator has thirty days to render an award.29°
The AHLA Rules also provide for expedited procedures. The expedited
procedures provide for telephone notice and communication. The arbitrator
will give notice of the hearing seven days in advance by telephone and the
hearing will be held within thirty days from the selection of the arbitrator.
There is no provision for discovery under the expedited procedure. The hear-
ing itself must be completed within one day or two consecutive days. The de-
cision should be complete within twenty days of the hearing.2 91
Arbitration awards should be in writing. The arbitrator may grant relief
deemed equitable within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The parties
287. Id, at Rule 2.02 & Rule 2.03.
288. Id. at Rule 2.05.
289. Id. at Rule 4.01, 4.02, 4.03.
290. Id. at Rule 4.01 - 4.15, 6.04.
291. Rules of Procedure for Meditation and Rules for Procedure for Arbitration, American
Health Laywers Association, Rule 5.01-5.03, 6.04 (1991).
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agree that the arbitrator may not award consequential, exemplary, incidental,
punitive, or special damages arising from a tort unrelated to employment or
the termination of employment unless the arbitrator determines that there is
clear and convincing evidence that the party is guilty of intentional conduct,
or acted with reckless disregard for the rights of the other party, or if there
was fraud. The arbitrator may award any liquidated damages to which the
parties have agreed. The decision of the arbitrator is binding upon the
parties.292
3. Mediation in Medical Malpractice
Mediation is a process in which a neutral third party facilitates commu-
nication between two or more parties to encourage reconciliation and resolu-
tion of the dispute. Mediation is sometimes referred to as "facilitated negotia-
tion" because the mediator facilitates negotiation between the parties to
encourage the parties to come to a mutually acceptable agreement?23 Unlike
arbitration ,in which the arbitrator makes a decision for the parties, in media-
tion the parties decide how they will resolve the dispute. 4 Generally, media-
tion has lower costs than litigation, can finalize the dispute much more
quickly, and reduce the emotional toll of adversarial litigation. z9 Further,
parties are often more satisfied with the process because of their ability to
control the outcome of the settlement.-
In medical malpractice cases, mediation can have advantages for both
parties. Health care providers may prefer the cost and time efficiency, privacy
of the forum that protects the reputation of the health care provider, and the
ability to control the outcome of the case and preclude large jury awards. The
patient may prefer mediation because of the ability to communicate dissatis-
faction with the clinical care received and achieve redress through monetary
and non-monetary compensation, the ability to structure an agreement that in-
cludes incentives to preclude further medical negligence, and the ability to re-
292. Id. at Rule 6.06
293. Forehand, supra note 2, 907, 919.
294. Amy Saravia, Orerview of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Hcalthcare Disputes, 32
J. OF HEALTH LAw 1, 141, 142 (1999).
295. Forehand, supra note 1, at 919,920.
296. Id. at 919. Rita Lowery Gitchell, and Andres Plattner, Mediation: A Viable Alternative
to Litigation for Aedical Malpractice Cases, 2 DEPAuL. . HEALTH CRE L 421. 422 (1999).
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solve the dispute quickly and efficiently.2 97 For both parties, there is the ad-
vantage that the communication process of mediation will help maintain the
doctor-patient relationship.2 98 The mediation process can also help the parties
focus on the issues of concern to the parties in contrast to the legal theories
of proof that are required in the courtroom.299 Mediation can also increase sat-
isfaction with the outcome when the parties are empowered to come to their
own decision in the dispute.30
Mediation raises potential concerns as well. Common concerns with me-
diation in the malpractice context include the concern that the patient will re-
ceive less compensation for injury than through litigation, concern that pa-
tients will be intimidated into a premature settlement, and concern that
mediation merely delays the process of litigation.301
In 1994 a study of several hundred medical malpractice cases arising in
a hospital that provided a voluntary, informal complaint process for patients
was conducted by Farber and White.3°2 Some of the patients began the medi-
cal malpractice process by filing a complaint with the dispute resolution of-
fice and some filed a lawsuit. The complaint process was less formal than
mediation and involved complainants and hospital staff discussing the dispute.
The intent was to encourage early settlement of claims. 30 3 The study found
that about half of the complaint-based disputes were resolved without filing a
lawsuit. Of the 465 cases that ended up in court, only 26 were tried to a ver-
dict and plaintiffs won only four cases.304 The study found that the manner in
which the case was resolved did not depend on whether there had been par-
ticipation in the informal complaint process. However, those cases that did
settle at the complaint stage settled for about one-third the amount of settle-
ment at later stages of the lawsuit. The study concluded that the informal
complaint process was an effective way to facilitate the flow of information
between the hospital and patients. 305
More recently a mediation process for resolving medical malpractice has
been implemented at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center in Chi-
297. Gitchell, supra note 292, at 441.
298. Forehand, supra note 2, at 920.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 921.
301. Id.
302. Henry S. Farber and Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dis-
pute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 1. LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994).
303. Id. at 791.
304. Id. at 802.
305. Farber, supra note 258, at 777.
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cago.3 6 The program was established in 1995 by the hospital because of the
"volatility and unpredictability" of jury awards.307 Prominent trial lawyers
and judges were asked to participate in the program and attend a mediation
training course at Loyola University's Institute for Health Law.-23 After the
training, voluntary mediation was available to parties of medical malpractice
cases. There have been forty-five mediations during the period of program
operation 3 9 The parties select either a retired judge or two attorney mediators
(one plaintiff and one defense attorney) to mediate. Prior to the mediation,
parties submitted statements of the facts, description of the injury, special
damages, and past and future expenses. The parties meet at a neutral location.
The mediation process used is for each party to present an opening statement,
then the mediators meet separately with the individual parties, then for the
parties to reconvene to conclude negotiations. 310 In most cases, the negotia-
tions have been successful. The program has found that mediation takes about
four or five hours and costs less than $5,000 per case as opposed to a jury
trial that may take days or weeks and cost $15,000 to $25,000. 3 1 Mediation
may be another viable alternative to litigation in the malpractice setting, how-
ever, like arbitration, little use of the alternative is the reality of the current
marketplace.
CONCLUSIONS
Medical malpractice arbitration has been encouraged through a variety of
legislation and reform, yet the number of cases going to arbitration is limited.
Have we created much ado about nothing by establishing the framework for a
system that is so little used? Maybe, but in light of future direction for medi-
cal malpractice in the new millennium, arbitration may play a stronger role as
more corporate entities become involved in the malpractice process. The ma-
306. News Release: Alternative Dispute Resolution Using Mediation Proves Successful for
Chicago Hospital, July 27, 1999. hup:/www.rush.edulNewlNews/MediaRelationsl99
072799mediation.htmL.
307. Id.
308. Md
309. Ia
310. ld. at 2.
311. News Release: Alternative Dispute Resolution Using Mediation Proves Successful for
Chicago Hospital, June 27, 1999, http:wivii.rush.edulnewlnews/medicalrelationsI99/
072799mediation.html
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jor medical malpractice arbitration trends in the year 2000 are (1) continued
use of medical malpractice awards in the process of credentialing and
priveledging physicians, (2) use of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements between physicians and hospitals or managed care organizations,
(3) the finding of enterprise liability for hospitals, health plans, and managed
care organizations for the actions of affiliated health care providers and the
extent of the ERISA preemption of entity liability, and (4) Cybermalpractice
issues that arise from negligent health care in cyberspace. Because these is-
sues all relate to corporate involvement in the malpractice arena there may be
an upsurge in use of arbitration agreements encouraged by corporate attempts
to limit liability through arbitration. While arbitration is no panacea for the
now chronic ills of the medical malpractice system, it has been shown to be
effective and efficient tool when used to resolve medical malpractice claims.
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